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IN HIS BOOK ENTITLED HelladosPeriegesis(Tourof
Greece), Pausanias included a short passage1 on gilded 
wooden statues of Dionysus, called xoanain Greek, dis-
played in the marketplace of Corinth. The concept of the 
xoanon, a primitive wooden image, has been an important 
part of the theories developed by classical art historians 
and archaeologists alike about the origins of Greek sculp-
ture. Based on the many references to xoana in ancient 
literature, it is thought that these basic wooden statues of 
the gods marked the beginning of Greek interest in statu-
ary. But unlike these traditional but popular ideas, A.A. 
Donohue, in a book about xoana published in 1988, has 
examined the ancient sources in detail and has found that 
the word xoanon can refer to all sorts of things, from a 
high degree of craftsmanship in any material to primitive 
wooden images. The word changes its meaning over time, 
and context is vital in understanding its meaning. Thus, 
Donohue has replaced a single meaning with a multilay-
ered one; instead of similarity she suggests heterogeneity. 
The idea of the primitive wooden statue as the predecessor 
to classical Greek sculpture has been shown to be the result 
of scholars focusing on certain texts to the exclusion of oth-
ers and reading these texts in a ‘closed’, stereotypical way. 
Donohue’s reading may mean that the term xoanon now 
has little archaeological value, but close contextual scrutiny 
of written sources in which the word is found can shed 
light on Greek attitudes towards images. As M. Shanks 
has put it ‘Donohue’s negative findings about the theory 
of early Greek sculpture turn out to be very positive for the 
historiography of classical art’.2
This is one of many examples that we could use in or-
der to demonstrate the change of attitudes towards clas-
sical texts witnessed in recent years. Together they mark 
the beginning of a different approach to ancient written 
sources and the understanding that our insight into the 
ancient world cannot be as straightforward, objective and 
unobstructed as we used to think, when following what 
we might term the ‘traditional stance’.
Since the Renaissance classical texts have been central 
to all attempts at understanding the Graeco-Roman past. 
The ancient texts that have survived have been used to 
analyze, interpret and understand the ancient world. 
They have been treated as ‘traces of the past’, equal to 
and sometimes more important than the ancient ruins 
and other remnants, by comparison with which they have 
been thought to offer a direct and unmediated access to 
the past ‘as it really was’. This traditional approach, in its 
search for the ‘true’ ancient world, has put itself within a 
historical discourse that searches for the ‘truth’ of the past. 
Thus, by creating ‘objective’ representations of this world, 
the temporal distance between the past and the present 
becomes of primary importance and the researcher is 
asked to achieve objectivity without perspective. 
This way of thinking has been central in the construc-
tion of archaeological methodology and narrative in 
Greece. Classical archaeology has been developed within 
the academic and intellectual realm of Altertumswissen
schaft, as a branch of Classics, with an unspoken assump-
tion as to the primacy of the ancient sources3 which can be 
read and understood ‘as they are’. This understanding of 
classical philology and history gave academics the tools to 
‘possess’ ancient Greece and to trace a line of power from 
ALEXANDRA BOUNIA
Ancient texts, classical archaeology and representation of the past:
the development of a dialogue
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:25:22 |
224 MOUSEIO BENAKI
A L E X A N D R A  B O U N I A
A  S I N G U L A R  A N T I Q U I T Y
it; texts became central to the construction of the national 
(archaeological) narrative. These tools are still in use in 
the methodology of classical archaeology in Greece, even 
though philology and history have changed, or are in the 
process of changing their attitudes towards the past and 
their understanding of the written sources. 
Post-modern approaches, developed mainly from the sev-
enties onwards in relation to subjects such as literature, an-
thropology, linguistics, sociology, psychoanalysis and so on, 
have influenced archaeology and have led to a re-evaluation 
of its theoretical framework and methods. My aim is not to 
examine the theoretical and methodological developments 
in archaeology or classical literature, but to highlight the 
fact that these have influenced not only the way ideas about 
history and the past are understood, but also the relation-
ship between classical archaeology and ancient texts. Issues, 
such as the nature of ideas, the relationship between lan-
guage and what it describes, the power of words to exceed 
the limits of their meaning, the idea that material culture 
can be understood and analyzed as text, along with differ-
ent constructions of the historical past, have offered classical 
archaeology and literature alike a series of epistemological 
tools that have empowered new readings of ancient texts 
and the material world and have contributed to the reali-
zation of a new relationship between classical archaeology 
and classical sources. These readings are based on a greater 
self-awareness on the part of the reader and they have made 
the issue of interpretation a central one. Thus, understand-
ing the role and importance of the written past becomes 
even more complicated when we approach it in terms of the 
philosophy of history, whereas the notion of representation 
poses a series of important questions, most important of 
which is the idea of rhetorical analysis. It is therefore neces-
sary for classical archaeology, too, to reconsider the role of 
the ancient sources and to develop new approaches to their 
understanding and evaluation. Consequently, the relation-
ship between ancient texts, classical archaeology, national 
narrative and perceptions of the past will be redefined and 
understood from a different perspective. 
It is the aim of this paper to present an alternative ap-
proach to the reading of ancient written sources for the pur-
poses of classical archaeology. The argument will be based 
on the notion of representation; I will use hermeneutics 
and in particular the ideas of Paul Ricoeur4 to support it. A 
brief discussion of Pliny the Elder’s NaturalHistory, will 
serve as an example. 
The traditional approach: representation as mimesis
Representation is the term used to describe the process 
whereby members of a common culture use language or 
some other system of signs to produce meaning. Aristotle 
in his Poetics and Plato in his Republic and other dia-
logues connect representation to mimesis ; they suggest 
that representation is a faithful reproduction of a natural 
source of truth. This idea acquires a central role in West-
ern thought, so much so that in the future the search for 
the truth, for the unmediated presence, becomes the cen-
tre of philosophical analysis. Thus, the temporal character 
of the present presence acquires primary importance and 
truth is the visible presence of real things. Therefore, what 
is real is experienced in the present. Whatever existed in 
the past but does not exist any more can be regained 
through the semiological practices of mimesis, through 
‘traces’ that remain.
Within this line of thought, there are two basic axi-
oms that develop: material culture, i.e. objects, is con-
sidered a carrier of self-evident truth, and the past can 
be understood/approached only through extant traces 
(objects and written texts) of it. The material presence 
of the trace vouches for its objectivity, offering access to 
a stable and, most importantly, accessible world. This is 
the ‘mimetic’ or ‘reflective’ approach of the theory of rep-
resentation, where meaning is confined to its carrier and 
language operates as a mirror to reflecting the real, the 
authentic meaning that already exists.5 
The ‘reflective approach’ has influenced archaeology 
and history alike. The task of the archaeologist has been 
defined as being to discover and present the past ‘as it re-
ally was’.6 Archaeology and history depend upon evidence, 
i.e. the trace of the past that survives in the present and 
delineates them. We are able to define the trace as what is 
left by the past, and, therefore, what ‘stands for it’ or ‘rep-
resents it’.7 The study of those traces, of the evidence, be 
they material or documentary, suffices to constitute his-
tory and archaeology as heuristic discourses different from 
the natural sciences. So powerful has been the impact of 
this documentary character in those disciplines, that posi-
tivism claims that we should allow the facts to ‘speak for 
themselves’ and that the ideal picture of the past would be 
the one that we could produce if we collected all the facts, 
or at least as many as possible to make it transparent and 
self-evident.8 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:25:22 |
3rd SU PPL E M EN T, AT H ENS 20 08 225
Ancient texts, classical archaeology and representation of the past: the development of a dialogue
A R C H A E O L O G Y  A N D  H E L L E N I C  I D E N T I T Y  I N  T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y  G R E E C E
The trace has been studied by the historian9 in epistemo-
logical terms, in the sense of its value as evidence, rather 
than ontologically, that is in the sense of it being a source 
of a kind of knowledge with indirect referential character. 
These ideas have influenced the aims and methodology 
of classical archaeology; they have influenced the crea-
tion of archaeological and historical museums, and as it 
was only natural, they have influenced the relationship 
between classical archaeology and ancient written sources. 
Archaeological material has been used to fill the gaps in 
the knowledge transmitted through the written sources 
(mainly on issues of everyday life), whereas texts offered 
social or other models that the archaeological material was 
expected to validate. 
Alternative approaches to representation
The theory of mimesis in representation, despite its un-
doubted pre-eminence, has not remained without criti-
cism. We could present different voices or tendencies in 
a synoptic way, by identifying three other theoretical 
trends.10 One has developed alongside the positive scienc-
es, and aims to create models, abstract and generalized 
representations of the world. This theoretical tendency 
has relied on the idea that the ‘real’ doesactuallyexist, but 
discovering it relies on formulating a theory that allows 
each interested person to decode it. New Archaeology was 
informed in large part by these ideas, relying as it did on 
methods imported from statistics, geography and the in-
formation sciences in an attempt to create a methodology 
that would allow archaeologists to overcome the flaws of 
‘traditional archaeology’ and provide reliable information 
about human activities in the past.11
The second trend is a negation of the theory of mimesis 
and proposes the idea that the only existing reality is the 
power of the researcher. His/her work is to formulate the 
narrative or the meta-narrative and thus to construct the 
real which will reflect their personal, subjective presence. 
The main emphasis is now transferred from the method of 
representation to the idea of representation and the person 
who undertakes this responsibility. In order to understand 
the past, we have to create narratives and then read them. 
The relationship between the narrative and the trace 
acquires primary importance, whereas the trace itself is 
studied ontologically. This view, by giving pre-eminence 
to the individual and by questioning the existence of an 
unmediated reality, often leads to a fragmentary notion 
of the world and a complete inability to create a definitive 
strategy and methodology which will allow its description 
and understanding. It leads, according to many of its oppo-
nents, to denial of the content and to the idea of the collage. 
In archaeology this trend can be related to what has been 
called ‘post-processual archaeology’, i.e. a theory that cares 
about the projection of the present onto the past, the sub-
jective construction of the past in the present and the role 
of the subjective past in power strategies today. Indigenous 
archaeologies, feminist archaeologies, post-colonial archae-
ologies and so on, offer alternative perspectives on the past, 
while archaeologists have been concerned about their own 
role in the construction of objectivity and truth.12 
The third tendency has as its starting point the philo-
sophical approach of hermeneutics. It rejects mimesis 
completely while recognizing the significant role of the 
interpreter. However, it does not share the idea of the pres-
ence of a universal, objective and neutral researcher, nor 
the complete absence of interpretative possibility and ab-
solute relativism favoured by the previous approach. It rec-
ognizes that interpretation is a dialogue between the data 
and the person who interprets it. This dialogue though is 
not an entirely personal affair, as the followers of the pre-
vious approach suggested, but is understood within a spe-
cific environment which can be the spiritual or cultural 
environment of a specific time and place or the environ-
ment of a specific institution (e.g. the museum), or even of 
a specific academic discipline (e.g. classical archaeology) 
at any given time. This approach has led to ‘contextual 
archaeology’, which aims to identify methods for study-
ing contexts in order to interpret meaning. ‘Contextual 
meaning’ refers first to the environmental, technological 
and behavioural context of action and second to the anal-
ogy between material cultural traits and the meaning of 
words in a written language.13
Taking into account the weaknesses of representation 
as mimesis on the one hand and the shortcomings of rep-
resentation as seen through the positive sciences and post-
modernity on the other, we will now focus on the last cat-
egory in order to examine how hermeneutics and the idea 
of representation that it suggests can lead us to a different 
approach to the relationship between classical archaeol-
ogy and literary sources. In the presentation of these ideas 
I shall use, as I have already mentioned, the ideas of Paul 
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Ricoeur. The choice of his work is not accidental; Ricoeur 
follows the tradition of hermeneutics developed by Sch-
leiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. He builds 
upon Gadamer’s critique that meanings interpreted are 
not restricted to the strategies and intentions of past actors 
and he claims that interpretations are situated historically 
in the past and in the present. In addition, Ricoeur has 
introduced the understanding of human action with refer-
ence to text, i.e. situated communication, and his work has 
been extensively used in support of contextual archaeology. 
Therefore, his views are considered to form a particularly 
interesting methodological tool for this analysis. 
Interpretation and representation according to Ricoeur
Ricoeur responded to what he considered the inadequa-
cies of structuralism14 by developing a hermeneutical ap-
proach, which addresses precisely these weaknesses. His 
ideas stem from a theory of language based on the sen-
tence and on the fundamental distinction between system 
and discourse.15 According to Ricoeur,16 all discourse is 
produced as an event, making it the counterpart of lan-
guage, but is understood as meaning. Initially the notion 
of meaning may be analyzed into two basic dimensions, 
comprising both an objective aspect, or that which the 
sentence means, and a subjective aspect, or that which the 
speaker means.17 Following Frege,18 Ricoeur further dis-
tinguishes between two components of the objective as-
pect of meaning: the sentence has both an ideal sense and 
a real reference. It is only at the level of the sentence that 
language can refer to something, that the closed universe 
of signs can be related to an extra-linguistic world.19 
‘The “objective” side of discourse […] may be taken in two 
different ways. We may mean the “what” of discourse or 
the “about what” of discourse. The “what” of discourse is 
its “sense”, the “about what” is its “reference”’.20 
This distinction is directly connected to that between 
semiotics and semantics. As opposed to language, where 
signs refer only to other signs, discourse refers to the 
world. This dimension of discourse is further linked to 
the creativity of language, and to the necessity for inter-
pretation.
The polysemy of words inherent in any natural language 
is linked simultaneously in a process where ambiguity is 
reduced through interpretation, and by extension through 
metaphor. Ricoeur challenges the traditional idea, which 
sees metaphor as a type of trope, and argues that it is a 
semantic innovation, which takes place at the level of the 
sentence.21 ‘Metaphor is [...] a contextual change of mean-
ing’;22 not the actualization of one of the meanings of a 
polysemic word, but a solely contextual action opposed 
to lexical changes.23 Thus Ricoeur’s working hypothesis 
proceeds ‘from metaphor to text at the level of “sense” and 
the explanation of “sense”, then from text to metaphor at 
the level of reference of a work to a world and to a self, that 
is, at the level of interpretation proper’.24 
Ricoeur turns to hermeneutics for his concept of the 
text. The text is a work of discourse, and hence it is a 
work : a structured totality irreducible to the sentences 
whereof it is composed, with a codified form, which 
characterizes its composition, and produced in a unique 
configuration which can be called its style.25 Unlike the 
‘logocentric’ tradition criticized by Derrida,26 Ricoeur 
does not prioritize the spoken discourse over the written; 
they are alternatives and both equally legitimate. But 
being written discourse, text is characterized by four 
traits, the four forms of distanciation : i) the fixation of 
meaning as opposed to the event of saying; ii) the dissocia-
tion of meaning from the mental intention of the author; 
iii) the non-ostensive nature of the text’s references and iv) 
the universal range of the text’s audience.27 These features 
provide the text with an autonomous status and determine 
Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. 
According to the first two forms of distanciation, the 
‘objective’ meaning of the text is different from the ‘sub-
jective’ meaning of its author.28 Hence ‘the problem of the 
right understanding can no longer be solved by a simple 
return to the alleged intention of the author’.29 Further-
more the other two forms lead to two attitudes toward the 
text: the first is that of structuralism, that is an attempt to 
explain the text through its internal relations; the second 
is to turn from ‘sense’ to ‘reference’ and to seek to under-
stand the world toward which the text points. This is what 
Ricoeur calls ‘interpretation’.30 
This line of thought leads to a series of important con-
clusions. First, it means that Ricoeur does not exclude 
structuralism, but accepts its methodology, although not 
as the complete answer. Second, it bridges the contradic-
tion between explanation and interpretation, which had 
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been a very distinct difficulty in the early hermeneutics. 
Third, Ricoeur changes the emphasis, from the ability of 
the reader to enter into the spiritual life of the writer to the 
world, which the work unfolds.
The culmination of Ricoeur’s interpretation theory is 
his views on appropriation, which he defines as: 
‘[T]he process by which the revelation of new modes of 
being [...] gives the subject new capacities for knowing 
himself. If the reference of a text is the projection of a 
world, then it is not in the first instance the reader who 
projects himself. The reader is rather broadened in his ca-
pacity to project himself by receiving a new mode of being 
from the text itself ’.31 
As a result, and in conjunction with hermeneutics’ efforts 
to reduce cultural distance and historical alienation, inter-
pretation is understood as a process of ‘bringing together’, 
‘equalizing’, ‘rendering contemporary and similar’.32 
‘To understand is to follow the dynamic of the work, its 
movement from what it says to that of which it speaks. 
Beyond my situation as reader, beyond the situation of 
the author, I offer myself to the possible mode of being-
in-the-world which the text opens up and discloses to me. 
That is what Gadamer calls the ‘fusion of horizons’ [...] in 
historical knowledge’.33 
With this definition, Ricoeur does not aim to avoid the 
structure known in the Romantic hermeneutic tradition 
as the ‘hermeneutical circle’. The thinkers of that tradi-
tion believe that the understanding of a text cannot be an 
objective procedure, in the sense of scientific objectivity, 
but that it was determined by a prior understanding on 
the part of the reader producing a circle between self-un-
derstanding and text-understanding. Ricoeur embraces 
this idea, which he identifies with appropriation, but he 
disagrees with the idea that the ‘hermeneutical circle’ con-
nects the subjectivities of the author and the reader on the 
grounds that ‘the emergence of the sense and the reference 
of a text in language is the coming to language of a world 
and not the recognition of another person’.34 Secondly, he 
disagrees with the idea that the projection of the subjectiv-
ity of the reading itself relates to the previous suggestion.
‘To understand oneself in the face of a text is quite the 
contrary of projecting oneself and one’s own beliefs and 
prejudices onto it; it is to let the work and its world enlarge 
the horizon of the understanding which I have of myself. 
[...] Thus the ‘hermeneutical circle’ is not repudiated but 
displaced from a subjectivist level to an ontological plane. 
The circle is between my mode of being – beyond the 
knowledge which I may have of it – and the mode opened 
up and disclosed by the text as the world of the work’.35 
Consequently, interpretation encompasses both the ap-
prehension of projected worlds and the advance of self-
understanding in the presence of these new worlds.
Ancient documents and historical reality
Ricoeur distinguishes between three tropes of historical 
writing: History-as-Same, History-as-Other and History-
as-Analogue.36 Each of these is characterized by a particu-
lar understanding of the relationship between past and 
present, or rather each attributes a different status to the 
written past.37 The first form, History-as-Same, is related 
to the re-enactment of the past in the present. It follows 
the idea of Collingwood,38 and calls for a conception of 
the past as history’s absentpartner.39 By re-enactment, 
Ricoeur40 means the rethinking of events, and definite-
ly not their reliving. In order to reach this conclusion 
Ricoeur poses the question: ‘Of what are the documents 
the trace?’, only to answer immediately: ‘they are the 
traces of thought ’, or what he calls the ‘inside of events’. 
Naturally, physical action cannot be ignored, so Ricoeur 
suggests that thought and physical changes together form 
action. The term ‘thought’ is defined very broadly to in-
clude motivation, intentions, desires. Thus, the historian 
has to think of himself in action, in order to discern the 
thought of its agent. Thus, we are able to claim that know-
ing what happened is knowing why it happened.41 
These limitations on the concept of historical evidence 
lead to the idea of re-enactment, which means rethink-
ing and incorporates the critical moment; this remains far 
from being a methodological tool. Re-enactment abolish-
es the temporal distance between past and present by re-
thinking what was once thought, and becomes the ‘medi-
um’ of survival for the past in the present: ‘One could say, 
paradoxically, that a trace becomes a trace of the past only 
when its pastness is abolished by the intemporal act of re-
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thinking the event as thought from inside. Re-enactment, 
understood in this way, resolves the paradox of the trace in 
terms of identity; while the phenomenon of the mark, the 
imprint, and that of its perpetuation are purely and simply 
sent back to the sphere of natural knowledge’.42 
In opposition to re-enactment stands the concern with 
recovering the sense of temporal distance.43 History in this 
sense attempts to make the past remote from the present 
and to produce an effect of strangeness. Thus, looking 
for the past becomes a sort of ethnological enquiry, at the 
service of the historian who attempts a spiritual decen-
tring of our traditional Western history.44 Consequently, 
the idea of temporal distance is understood today in simi-
lar terms to the idea of the Other. This becomes the best 
analogue of historical understanding. Thus, the special 
characteristic related to the survival of the past in the 
present is eluded. Moreover, the otherness in this sense 
introduces the idea of difference, and we pass from the 
pair same-other to the pair identity-difference.45 The idea 
of difference may serve several uses. Ricoeur considers 
two of them: the question of individuality and deviation. 
He argues that:  ‘in order for the individual to appear as 
difference (sic), historical conceptualisation must itself be 
conceived of as the search for and the posing of variants. 
[...] The historical fact would then have to be grasped as 
a variant generated by the individualisation of those in-
variants’.46 
As far as deviation is concerned, it leads to a philosophy 
of history where the past is a ‘pertinent absence’.47 But the 
question remains: ‘how could a difference take the place 
of something which today is absent and lost, but once was 
real and living, being itself relative to an abstract system 
and as detemporalised as possible?’.48 
The difficulties inherent in both History-as-Same and 
History-as-Other can be overcome by History-as-Ana-
logue. In order to define Analogue, we have a rhetorical 
theory of tropes, in which the primary position is held by 
metaphor.49 Ricoeur is concerned about the idea of recon-
structing the past, and in his attempts to elucidate this he 
relies on the efforts of White to present the ‘representa-
tive’ dimension of history through the theory of tropes.50 
Ricoeur uses his ideas on History-as-Analogue to bridge 
the gap between his theories of narrative and metaphor. 
More specifically, in the RuleofMetaphor, he argues that 
metaphor makes an ontological claim and has a referential 
import.51 He hopes that the concept of refiguring time 
through narrative – i.e. the core of his mimesis III52 – will 
be enriched by an enquiry into the role of figures in the 
constitution of the relation ‘taking-the-place-of ’ or ‘rep-
resenting’.53
According to White,54 historical discourse has to com-
ply with both the constraints related to the privileged 
type of plot and to the past itself, through the textual 
material available at a given moment: ‘Before the histo-
rian can bring to bear upon the data of the historical field 
the conceptual apparatus he will use to represent and ex-
plain it, he must first prefigure the field – that is to say 
constitute it as an object of mental perception’.55 In order 
to understand, then, what happened in the past we need 
to prefigure as a possible object of knowledge the whole 
set of events reported in the documents. The tropes of 
rhetorical discourse offer a variety of figures of discourse 
for this prefiguration (metaphor; metonymy; synecdoche; 
irony).56 The most representative function among these 
belongs to metaphor.57 Thanks to the tropological frame 
of reference, the beingas of the past event is brought to 
language. Summing up his reading of White’s theory, 
Ricoeur concludes that ‘a certain tropological arbitrari-
ness must not make us forget the kind of constraint that 
the past exerted on historical discourse through known 
documents, by demanding an endless rectification on its 
part’.58
 Although Ricoeur accepts White’s ideas about the 
importance of metaphor and rhetorical tropes to the 
analysis of historical events, and believes that these offer 
credibility to his own ideas about the need for the progres-
sion through the Same and the Other to the Analogue, 
he cannot fail to notice that without the Same and the 
Other, White’s ideas run the risk of erasing the dividing 
line between fiction and history.59 Thus, Ricoeur assigns 
to Analogue the role of fighting the prejudices which 
maintain that an historian’s language should be transpar-
ent and that fiction can have no claim on reality. More 
specifically, Analogue presents the problem of the reality 
of the historical past with the solution of offering mean-
ing to ‘really’ in terms of ‘such as’. It holds within it the 
ideas of both re-enactment and distancing, in the sense 
that beingas is both being and not being. These ideas of 
Ricoeur’s do not aim to expose fully the relationship be-
tween ‘taking-the-place-of ’ and ‘representing’. They are 
offered more as a contribution to what remains enigmatic 
in the pastness of the past as such.60 
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Analysis of ancient texts and classical archaeology 
All the issues presented above concerning the nature of 
meaning, the relationship between language and what 
it describes, ‘ the capacity of words to exceed their al-
lotted functions of argumentation, demonstration and 
proof ’,61 and the different constructions of the histori-
cal past, present classical scholarship with a series of new 
epistemological tools, capable of offering more profitable 
and thought-provoking insights into the classical texts.62 
The main argument inveighs against the monolithic ap-
proaches to classical texts that scholars (philologists and 
archaeologists alike) traditionally espouse,63 and urges a 
more flexible appreciation of their polyvalence. The posi-
tivist and historicist approaches, which still dominate the 
study of ancient texts, can be, and are, severely criticized 
in the light of these epistemological advances.64 The new 
‘readings’, which come to replace the traditional ones, 
are based upon a greater self-awareness on the part of the 
reader/scholar. The notion of interpretation then acquires 
a further dimension beyond simply being a ‘deciphering’ 
of meaning; the appreciation of the status of the written 
past becomes more complex in terms of the philosophy of 
history, and the question of representation raises a number 
of important issues, the most timely among them being 
the rhetorical system of analysis.
Traditional approaches, in their search for the ‘real’ an-
cient world, invoke the notion of, and inscribe themselves 
within, a discourse of history, which seeks to ground itself 
in the actuality of the past.65 Hence an artificial distinction 
is created – in the sense that it is projected as determining, 
whereas it is not – between past and present actualities, 
each supported in practice by historicism and textualism 
respectively. Historicism, on the one hand, aims to present 
the past as ‘it really was’ by constructing ‘objective’ repre-
sentations of it. Thus it leads to a presentation resembling 
the idea of the Same (in Ricoeur’s terms), in the sense that 
the temporal distance between past and present acquires 
the leading role and the historian gestures towards a non-
perspectival objectivity. Textualism, on the other hand, 
asserts that historical events are discursively selected, 
shaped and organized under a teleological shadow, and 
therefore, history is an accommodation of the past in the 
interests of the present. Kennedy therefore argues that the 
distinction created between these two modes of thinking 
about the past and its texts, far from being determining, 
is enabling.66 Following literary criticism and the renewed 
concern with representation in all its forms, from which 
stems the idea of language and textuality as operative met-
aphors for cultural production, he denies the existence of 
any world of objective facts to which language provides 
unobstructed access; instead he supports the notion that 
systems of representation always problematize and obfus-
cate the real as much as they reflect it.67 Therefore:
 ‘[ I ]n order to depict and argue for the multiplicity of rep-
resentations, it is necessary to project “representation” as a 
foundational term of transhistorical validity, a preoccupa-
tion ‘present’ in the texts of the past; in order to argue for 
‘differences’ it is necessary to posit sameness or identity, 
and vice versa. A discourse of ‘representation’ provides a 
set of terms which enable and determine the articulation 
of issues of reality, identity, control etc’.68 
‘Representation’ thus becomes a key issue in the study of 
classical texts due to its consequences. First, it provides 
a more accurate way of thinking about the past as Ana-
logue, that is by substituting the ‘real’ with the ‘such as’ 
and thus combining History-as-Same and History-as-
Other; it consequently becomes the enabling aspect of 
the distinction. Second, as a discourse it opens up the 
way towards a rhetorical system of analysis, providing a 
new epistemological tool. Third, in representation as a 
discourse the key trope becomes metaphor, which is not 
only a very useful epistemological tool, but also leads to 
a different appreciation of interpretation. Finally, in the 
light of this interpretation the single meaning is ques-
tioned. If we approach the past in terms of representation, 
the meaning of the past cannot be single and unique. Each 
of those points is important for our understanding of the 
ancient texts.
Ricoeur defines interpretation as an activity culminat-
ing in the act of appropriation. These two terms and ideas 
are closely interwoven (and therefore in accordance with 
the need for a ‘reading’ which combines both the Same 
and the Other). Interpretation though does not merely 
mean the projection of one’s own world onto the text. The 
deconstructionist ideas of Barthes and Derrida concern-
ing the open-endedness of the text diminish the role of 
the author too much for the aims of classical archaeology 
(and this argument). Certainly, neither does this mean 
that the text had/has an ‘original’ meaning, pre-conceived 
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and intentionally pre-addressed to us nor that it opens up 
a window to the ‘real past’. The writers of the texts wrote 
them with different aims in mind. Therefore, our task to-
day is very different from theirs. Appropriation, as defined 
by Ricoeur, bridges this gap between the reader and the 
world of the text, and leads to the ‘making of one’s own 
something that was initially alien and distant’.69 
The notion of representation, as shaped within herme-
neutics, denies the existence of a world of objective facts to 
which language or some other system of symbols (e.g. ob-
jects) can offer unobstructed access. By contrast, it claims 
that all representation systems create more questions than 
they answer. Therefore, in order to present and describe 
the multitude of representations, it is necessary to focus 
on the notion of representation itself as a basic character-
istic of the inter-historical validity and to recognize that 
it is present in all texts of the past, material and textual. 
Thus, in order to talk about differences, we should stress 
similarities and viceversa adinfinitum. This approach 
relates to the past as a totality and is valid for both classical 
archaeology and classical literature. 
Therefore, the study of ancient texts gives us access to 
the truth of the past, but it also offers the reader-researcher 
an insight into the world of the text and therefore into 
self-knowledge and the extension of self-knowledge. The 
emphasis is thus transferred from searching for the inten-
tions of the ancient writer and/or reader and validating 
his/her accuracy and truth to the fact that a world be-
comes language. This metaphor helps us to understand 
the importance and the operation of material culture as 
text and of the text as a symbolic system of representa-
tion, the one an extension of the other and both together 
extensions – languages – of the world from which they 
originate. Therefore, metaphor operates on many levels 
and ensures multiple meanings. Material texts are related 
metaphorically to the world, while the references to these 
texts by ancient writers become in their turn metaphors of 
the world and metaphors of the material texts. Thus, the 
need for the creation of rhetorical schemas for understand-
ing and analyzing material, for the creation of knowledge 
about the past is born. Simultaneously, the relationship 
between classical archaeology and the ancient sources be-
comes more complicated and more challenging. 
Mistrust of the positivist approaches, combined with an 
understanding of the multiplicity of interpretation and the 
role of the interpreter, interprets (sic) in its turn the intro-
duction of a new field of studies, only recently developed 
as far as classics are concerned, namely reception theory.70 
This is based on several of the ideas we developed earlier, 
and mainly on the idea that there is a living continuum of 
elements that structures the tradition of classical studies 
and contributes to its development in time. Their recep-
tion and interpretation is added to the sources anew and 
therefore each generation of researchers in reality faces dif-
ferent texts, since they have been altered by their recep-
tion in previous periods. It becomes obvious that all these 
ideas influence and redefine the relationship of classical 
archaeology to the ancient sources, putting them into a 
continuous and continual dialogue.
Pliny and his NaturalHistoryas a source of knowledge 
for classical archaeology
Recent approaches to classical archaeology take into ac-
count new perspectives in the study of classical sources, 
such as the example of the xoana elaborated at the be-
ginning of this paper. It is clear that ancient texts are far 
from transparent windows onto the ancient world; they 
are complex and unclear and require interpretation. We 
are going to focus on a work by a Roman author, Pliny 
the Elder, entitled NaturalHistory(NH), and to attempt 
a reading that will take into account the ideas of Paul 
Ricoeur and hermeneutics as presented above.
NH was dedicated in AD 77 or 78 to the heir to the im-
perial throne, Titus. It consists of 37 books which cover a 
number of subjects ranging from cosmology and geogra-
phy, to anthropology, zoology, botany, medicine and met-
allurgy. Books 33 to 37, which according to Pliny himself 
are devoted to mineralogy and metallurgy, have been 
considered a major archaeological source, as this is where 
Pliny discusses works of art, classifying them according to 
their materials (marble, bronze, etc). Classical archaeology 
uses these books as its main source of knowledge on mat-
ters of attribution, identification, ways of display of art in 
antiquity, or even provenance. Often, Pliny’s accuracy is 
tested against actual archaeological finds. Alternatively, 
archaeological discussion is transferred from the actual 
assemblages, to Pliny’s sources. Other classical treatises 
discuss the work of Pliny in terms of its political role, i.e. 
they try to reconstruct the intentions of the author in the 
broader context.71 In general terms, these books are con-
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sidered separately from their companion volumes; Pliny’s 
attitudes toward art are kept separate from his attitudes 
toward science; his aesthetics are thought of as different 
from his natural philosophy and his moralism as distinct 
from his curiosity. 
Based on the ideas presented above, I decided to study 
NH using as a conceptual tool the idea of ‘collection’. My 
argument has been that Pliny’s work should be under-
stood as a totality and the above shortcomings should be 
addressed. Taking analogy into account, I suggest that 
Pliny created the most complete textual collection that 
survives from the ancient world. And this is not limited 
to the ‘art history’ chapters but refers to the whole of his 
treatise. He has also offered a unique account of actual 
private art collections that decorated the city of Rome and 
other parts of the Empire, that were amassed by collectors, 
whose motives and discourse Pliny has preserved and in-
terpreted for us. For that reason, Pliny’s NH is important 
in any discussion regarding classical archaeology today: 
not only as a source of information about individual ob-
jects but because it offers a unique insight into a totality. 
Attention is usually paid to NH as a source of information 
about the objects themselves, rather than to their assem-
blages and to its own character as a collection and as a 
paradigm of collecting that drew enthusiastic followers 
many centuries after its formation. Using the idea of rep-
resentation, Pliny’s encyclopaedia, in the sense of a list of 
information about various objects and data, has been un-
derstood as a representation of the world from which these 
objects and data derived. In that sense, NHis a systematic 
collection itself. Furthermore, it is a meta-language of the 
phenomenal, factual world, a ‘reading’ of other practices 
and discourses. The main argument has been that by trac-
ing the formation, taxonomy and aim in both cases, it is 
possible to comprehend first the way in which the classi-
cal world is related to its material culture and second how 
indebted the categories of art and culture which we have 
inherited today are to the past. Both these issues are vital 
for classical archaeology and offer a different approach to 
various periods of the past, but also to the present. 
NH has a broad subject matter that exceeds the limits 
usually set for encyclopaedic works. Its broad perspective 
had been shaped by Pliny’s perception of the world, which 
in turn defined was determined by Stoic naturalism. Na-
ture is a passive and an active element in life, and as such 
it is contained even in the humblest little thing. In this 
sense, Pliny’s belief that he can assemble the world in his 
books seems absolutely rational and justifiable. Further-
more, NH is an historical work, in the sense that it presents 
an attempt at recording for posterity the accomplishments 
of the Roman people and the power of the Roman state. 
This accounts for many of the decisions taken by Pliny, 
such as for instance the inclusion of the ‘art history’ chap-
ters, as well as his attempt to write a history of culture and 
technology, along with a natural history. The genuinely 
historical character of NH ascribes the work to the tradi-
tion of antiquarianism. In his search for the remarkable 
and the noteworthy, Pliny expands the horizon of the 
traditional historical account, and provides a Natural
History, in which all the aspects of nature and culture are 
included. We can define the antiquarian as a student of 
the past, who unlike the historian writes in a systematic 
order (instead of a chronological one), collects all the items 
that are connected with a certain theme, whether they can 
be of any assistance in solving a problem or not, and deals 
with subjects that are considered better suited to system-
atic description than to a chronological account.72 Pliny’s 
work fits this description remarkably well: influenced by 
Stoic conceptions of nature and the world, he undertakes 
the role of a systematic recorder of all the thaumasia (‘the 
wonders’) that the city of Rome and the Roman world 
have amassed, in order to preserve their memory for the 
future, but also to provide his contemporaries with a treas-
ury of knowledge about the history of civilization, and in 
particular, about the history of Roman power.
Furthermore, Pliny is actually a unique source of infor-
mation on the subject of collecting in the Roman world. 
More important than the actual collections of informa-
tion about specific statues and artists, Pliny records for 
posterity and interprets the reception of art. The writer 
defends a hierarchy of values that he defines as distinct 
from those of his contemporaries, and he exemplifies this 
in his own work and in his own ‘collection’, as opposed 
to the actual collections that others had assembled. Col-
lections in the public domain, which are the product of 
the beneficent intervention of emperors and generals, as 
well as collections made up of spoils from victorious wars 
against the enemies of Rome, are very explicitly valued 
and appreciated. By contrast, private collections are dis-
couraged, at least as long as they are deemed to express a 
sinister relationship with material culture, ignorance, or 
neglect of the natural values, and lack of rationality.
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Pliny does not deny the existence of or the necessity for 
collections; on the contrary, he offers a definition of the 
notion of collection in the classical world. A collection be-
comes a set of works of art, artefacts, and natural curiosi-
ties set aside as a vehicle for propaganda and comparison 
between the morally accomplished and the degenerates, as 
well as symbols of military prowess and Roman superior-
ity. The central spine of the items in a collection therefore 
is their political and ideological messages and not their 
aesthetic value. This is so because of the role of the collec-
tion as a space of artificial memory. Therefore, collections 
operate as monumenta of illustrious men, and as ‘evidence’ 
of human achievements and Nature’s grandeur. 
Based on these remarks, we can conclude that Pliny was 
putting his own views into practice when he wrote NH, 
and that the latter is his own ‘collection’. Naturally, this 
development relates to a more general understanding of 
collections in the classical world, and Pliny simply offers 
the culmination of a long-standing tradition, in which the 
collecting of facts and information was as important as the 
collection of material objects, if not more so. Already in 
the classical Greek world, antiquarians had introduced the 
tradition of assembling in one book the ‘objects’ of their 
interest, whether this be votive offerings in Greek sanctu-
aries, euremata, or information about practices, beliefs, 
institutions, or even people. This antiquarian tradition 
was taken over by Varro and Atticus in the Roman world, 
not to mention the paradoxographers, and the writers of 
mirabilia. Their collections were textual, of course, con-
fined within the pages of books, but serving the same pur-
pose that the actual ones were called upon to serve. They 
were assemblages of facts, intended for future generations 
as well as contemporaries, as sources of knowledge, admi-
ration, political and national pride, that would testify to 
the grandeur of their own society.
Pliny’s work was part of this tradition, and in many 
ways summarized it for future generations. It was not 
only his collection perse that was important for his fol-
lowers, but also his collecting mode. Pliny’s encyclopae-
dic spirit, his classification principle, his understanding 
of collections as methods of commemoration and loci of 
memory influenced the Renaissance collectors directly 
or indirectly. The textual character of Pliny’s collection 
influenced their view about the dialectic relationship 
between res and verba. Their ‘museums’, ‘cabinets’ or 
‘theatres’ were the tangible illustrations of their ‘museums 
on paper’, which aimed to serve the same purpose and 
ensured accessibility and popularity. In other words, the 
early museum catalogues, instead of being a result of the 
collecting activities, have to be seen as a cause, a reason for 
them. NaturalHistory is undoubtedly the guiding light 
behind them, and a unique monument whose importance 
goes far beyond the limits of its era and far beyond its role 
as a source of information about the genealogy of Greek 
art. This understanding offers classical archaeology a far 
more theoretical standpoint. It connects classical with 
modern art appreciation, early collections with museums 
(as they have developed since the Renaissance). In addi-
tion it has created an understanding or appreciation of 
the relationship between classical archaeology and clas-
sical sources ever since. In other words, such a reading of 
Pliny, offers an insight into the basic theory of classical 
archaeology itself. 
Conclusions
To sum up, in this paper I have focused on the notion of 
representation as a basic theoretical approach for the study 
of ancient sources and the creation of a new relations be-
tween them and classical archaeology. I have suggested 
areading of ancient sources based on a hermeneutic ap-
proach. To this end I have appropriated post-modern ideas 
which contribute to the formation of theory in the field of 
classical archaeology and research. I suggest that the re-
lationship between ancient sources, classical archaeology 
and representation of the past is not a positivist unilateral 
one; on the contrary, it is multileveled, complex, open and 
profound. It is a dialogue in progress and it can contribute 
to a better understanding of the past and the present. 
The discussion of representation offers a multitude of 
terms that empower and define the way we deal with mat-
ters of truth, identity, control and so on. Interpretation, 
as understood in the work of Ricoeur, becomes through 
metaphor the necessary requirement for appropriation 
and inclusion. At the same time, the ‘ideal’ relation to the 
past as presented above is understood as interpretation; 
this ideal relation can be defined as the ‘horizon for the 
waiting of new questions’ and not as a taboo or a compre-
hensive solution. The past (texts, symbols, objects) speaks 
to the extent real people ask it questions and its true heirs 
are those who interpret it.
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We are thus led to the conclusion that representation is 
a key term for the study of key term classical texts. First, 
because it allows us to understand the roots of many con-
temporary ideas and therefore confronts us with the need 
to re-evaluate and re-frame them. Second, because it offers 
a more accurate way of thinking about the past as Analogy, 
in other words to replace the notion of the ‘real’ with the 
notion of the ‘same’ (such as), and to combine History-as-
Same and History-as-Other. Therefore, an intermediate, 
empowering connection is created between multiple op-
posing and often contradictory tropes of thought. Third 
because, as discourse, interpretation leads the way towards 
a rhetorical system of analysis and therefore it offers us new 
epistemological tools. The most important and useful of 
these tools is probably metaphor, which apart from its 
usefulness, also leads us towards a different appreciation 
of interpretation. Finally, the idea of there being just one 
meaning is considered doubtful and untenable. Under the 
prism of representation, the past does not acquire a single 
meaning, but multiple ones, complex and flexible. By their 
emphasis on metaphor, rhetorical co-expressions of appro-
priation extend the initial meaning both semiologically and 
through content-based terms, providing multiple mean-
ings. The task is not to interpret as a means of accessing the 
real past, understanding its motivations and interests, on 
its own terms. Interpretation organizes, divides, arranges, 
composes connections, describes relations, but without the 
certainty of an origin. The archaeologist can only weave 
connections that establish insights and plausibilities and are 
as much about the present as about the past. 
Classical archaeology today cannot afford to ignore this 
understanding. It is essential for classical archaeology to 
develop a different approach towards the ancient sources 
that will contribute to a reconsideration and restructuring 
of the narratives that it has created for itself. This is the 
only way for classical archaeology to retain its relevance 
to contemporary, multifarious, complex, polyvalent, in-
teresting societies.  
Alexandra Bounia
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Koufou, Lenio Myrivili and Marlen Mouliou for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this paper and their suggestions for 
improvements. Of course, all shortcomings remain my own.
 1. ‘On the market place, where most of the sanctuaries are, 
stand Artemis, surnamed Ephesian and wooden statues (xoana) 
of Dionysos, which are covered with gold with the exception 
of their faces; these are ornamented with red paint’ (Pausanias 
2.2.6).
 2. Shanks 1996, 121-22.
 3. Snodgrass 1991; Morris 1994.
 4. French philosopher (1913-2005). He combined phenom-
enological description with hermeneutic interpretation in order 
to study human reality (Reagan 1996; Dosse 1997).
 5. Hall 1997; Spariosu 1984.
 6. ‘Wie es eigentlich gewesen’: Ranke’s agenda, from the 
1830s, quoted and discussed in Carr 1986, 3.
 7. Ricoeur 1984, 1-3.
 8. Thomas 1990, 18. 
 9. I use the term ‘historian’ from now on to include archae-
ologists and all those whose interests lie in the past.
 10. Duncan & Ley 1993.
 11. Seminal to this approach is the work of D.L. Clarke 
(1937-1976); see, in particular, Clarke 1968; Clarke 1972.
 12. See, for a general introduction Hodder 1986, Ch. 8.
 13. For arguments in favour of this methodological approach 
to archaeology, see Hodder 1986. Post-processual archaeologi-
cal theory has argued against contextualism and has questioned 
the relationship between material culture and text. Neverthe-
less, given the strong relationship between classical archaeology 
and written sources as well as the positivistic stance towards 
the past that classical archaeology takes even today, I believe 
that the hermeneutical approach of contextual archaeology is 
particularly well suited to become the transitional phase in the 
development of classical archaeology in Greece and to meet the 
post-modern theoretical concerns of today. Hellenic archaeol-
ogy is not yet ready to accept the inherent subjectivity of its 
discourse and therefore hermeneutics and contextual archaeol-
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ogy offer an interesting ‘middle ground’. I should stress at this 
point that this is not a theoretical suggestion for an approach 
to classical archaeology, but an attempt to discuss ancient texts 
in such a way as to render them useful to classical archaeology. 
 14.  That is the dichotomy of langue and parole, the sub-
ordination of diachronic to synchronic and the emphasis on 
language as opposed to the ‘real world’ (Tilley 1990, 58-60).
 15.  ‘The transition to the level of discourse creates the pos-
sibility of a genuine semantics of the sentence, as distinct from 
the semiotics of the sign’ (Thompson 1981, 11).
 16. Ricoeur 1981, 137; 167. 
 17. Moore 1990, 91; Thompson 1981, 11.
 18. Frege 1970.
 19. Thompson 1981, 11.
 20. Moore 1990, 91.
 21. Moore 1990, 92.
 22. Ricoeur 1981, 170.
 23. Ricoeur 1981, 169.
 24. Ricoeur 1981, 172.
 25. Moore 1990, 93; Thompson 1981, 13; Ricoeur 1981, 
136.
 26. Derrida 1976, 101-40; Derrida 1978, 278-93; for a com-
mentary regarding the ‘reading’ of material culture, see Tilley 
1990, 60-66.
 27. Moore 1990, 95.
 28. Thompson 1981, 14. 
 29. Ricoeur 1981, 161.
 30. Ricoeur 1981, 153.
 31. Quoted in Moore 1990, 97.
 32. Ricoeur 1981, 185.
 33. Ricoeur 1981, 177.
 34. Ricoeur 1981, 178.
 35. Ricoeur 1981, 178.
 36. The idea of ‘analogy’ is often related in archaeological 
interpretation to the ‘Middle Range Theory’, developed mainly 
by Binford in the seventies. According to him, archaeologists 
should create a methodology that would allow them to make 
valid correlations between the material culture of the past, 
which they can observe, and social behaviour, which they can-
not. It is suggested that they should turn to the identification 
of patterns, using ethnographic methods. The main argument 
against this theory is that the creation of these patterns involves 
uniformitarian assumptions and generalizations which cannot 
be applied to the past. For a discussion of ‘Middle Range 
Theory’ see Trigger 1989, 361-67; Raab & Goodyear 1984; 
Hodder 1986, 107-20. The notion of ‘analogy’ I discuss in this 
paper does not relate to the above understanding. It is used as a 
rhetorical tool of interpretation and it rejects any prior assump-
tion of the existence of universal laws simply by emphasizing 
the role of the non-universal, non-uniform individual who 
puts the questions (this is a central notion in hermeneutics) 
and understands/creates meaning. 
 37. Thomas 1990, 18. 
 38. Collingwood 1993.
 39. Ricoeur 1984, 5. 
 40. Ricoeur 1984, 8. 
 41. Ricoeur 1984, 7.
 42. Ricoeur 1984, 11-12.
 43. The destruction of the notion of historical time is the 
disadvantage of re-enactment (Ricoeur 1984, 15).
 44. Ricoeur 1984, 15. 
 45. Ricoeur 1984, 17-18. 
 46. Ricoeur 1984, 18. 
 47. Ricoeur 1984, 23.
 48. Ricoeur 1984, 24.
 49. Ricoeur 1984, 27.
 50. Ricoeur 1984, 27; White 1978.
 51. White 1978, 28.
 52. Mimesis is a central idea in Ricoeur’s theory of history, 
time and narrative. Narrative leads to the creation of a new 
work of synthesis: a plot. Plots mimic action, through a poetic 
refiguring of action. The dynamic of emplotment is central to 
the understanding of the relationship between time and nar-
rative. Emplotment consists of three moments of mimesis: 
mimesis I, mimesis II, and mimesis III. Mimesis I involves the 
realization that to imitate or represent action is first to ‘pre-un-
derstand’ what human action is, in its semantics, its symbolic 
system and its temporality. Mimesis II has a mediating func-
tion which derives from the dynamic character of the config-
uring operation known as emplotment. Mimesis III marks the 
intersection of the world of the text and the world of the reader; 
that is the world configured by the plot and the world in which 
real action occurs and which unfolds its specific temporality. 
The transition from Mimesis II to Mimesis III is brought about 
by the act of reading (Moore 1990, 102-5). 
 53. Ricoeur 1984, 28.
 54. White 1973; White 1978.
 55. White 1973, 30; cf. Ricoeur 1984, 29.
 56. White 1973, 31-38; White 1978, 121-34.
 57. White 1978, 90-91; cf. Ricoeur 1984, 30.
 58. Ricoeur 1984, 33-34.
 59. Ricoeur 1984, 33. 
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